Several axiomatic systems for sentential calculus have been developed. Such systems are generally motivated by a consideration of logically true sentences of the formal language. In this paper I present a finitely axiomatized system of sentential calculus for logically false sentences.
I will assume the standard definition for "sentence of L." The metasymbols R, R λ , R 2 , . . . will be used to refer to sentences of L. In addition, I will presuppose the standard theory of two-valued truth tables. I will say that a sentence of L is logically true (LT) if and only if the final column of its truth table has only T's. I will say that a sentence of I is logically false (LF) if and only if the final column of its truth table has only F's. I will say that two sentences R λ and R 2 of L are logically equivalent (R γ LE R 2 ) if and only if the sentence (R γ & R 2 ) v (Ί R X & iR 2 ) is LT.
2. The System SCT. In [1] , Hubert and Ackermann present an axiomatic system of sentential calculus for logical truths. With some small notational differences, their system uses the symbols mentioned above and in addition the symbol "-•". As they note, however, this symbol is to be considered an abbreviation; if βj and R 2 are any two sentences of the language, then R 1 -*R 2 is to be considered an abbreviation for the sentence iRivR 2 ([l], pp. 27-28). In discussing their system, I will eliminate this abbreviation. Since their system is primarily concerned with LT sentences, I will refer to their system as SCT (sentential calculus for truths). With slight notational differences and the removal of the symbol "->", the Hubert and Ackermann system may be presented as follows:
Axioms:
Rules of Proof:
1. Rule of substitution: We may substitute in a given sentence of L for a sentential variable any sentence of L, providing that the substitution is made wherever that sentential variable occurs. 2. Rule of Γ-implication: From two sentences R ι and -\R x vR 2 the sentence R 2 may be obtained.
I will assume the standard definition of "proof in SCT." If the sentence R of L is provable in SCT, I will write ^τ R. Let λ be a set of sentences of I. If R is provable in SCT from the axioms augmented by the members of λ, I will write λ ^ R. Using these notions, the following theorems may be proved about SCT ( [1] , chapter 1): 3 The System SCF. I will now present a system of sentential calculus for LF sentences of Z; I will refer to this system as SCF. I will prove theorems about SCF that are analagous to the theorems presented above about SCT.
Axioms:
(fa) lίPx&Pj&Px
1. Rule of substitution: same as that for SCT.
Rule of F-implication:
From the two sentences R x and τRi&β 2 the sentence R 2 may be obtained.
I will again assume the standard definition of "proof in SCF." If the sentence R of L is provable in SCF, I will write ^ R. As for SCT, if λ is a set of sentences of I, I will write λ ^ R when R is provable in SCF from the axioms augmented by the members of λ. Theorems analogous to those presented above for SCT could be proven in a straightforward manner for SCF without reference to SCT. However, I will construct proofs for such theorems (except Theorem A f ) by relating them to the theorems for SCT. In the following material, I will make use of the one-to-one function F from the set of sentences of L onto the set of sentences of L, defined in the following way:
Proof: By induction on the number, n, of connectives in R; n will be called the length of R. Suppose n = 0. Then R is a sentential variable, say P, . Then by (a), F(F(Pi)) = F{Pi) = P;. Suppose the theorem is true for all n less than some number p, p greater than 0. We must show that the theorem holds for p. Let R be an arbitrary sentence of length p. Then R must be of
But R, has length p -1, and thus by assumption the theorem holds for
Similarly it is easy to show that if R has the form R λ vR 2 or #! & R 2 then the theorem holds. Thus the theorem holds for n = p, and hence for all n. The following lemmas will be needed for the proof of the next theorem.
Lemma 1: // Rι is the result of substituting R 2 in R 3 for the sentential variable Pj, then F(Rj is the result of substituting F(R 2 ) in F(R 3 ) for P, .
Proof: By induction on the length, n, of R 3 . Suppose n = 0. Then R 3 must be a sentential variable. Suppose R 3 is P t . Then R λ = R 2 , and
where Pj Φ Pi. Then R± = R 3 , and thus β x is Pj. But then both F(fli) and F(R 3 ) are just Pj. Hence, .F(fli) is the result of substituting F(R 2 ) in F(R 3 ) for P im Thus the lemma holds for n = 0. Now, suppose the lemma is true for all n less than some number p, where p is greater than 0. Let R 3 be an arbitrary sentence of L of length p.
Case 1: R 3 = iR 4 , for some R 4 . Then R λ = iR 5 , for some β 5 , where R 5 is the* result of substituting R 2 in # 4 for the sentential variable P;. But fl 4 is of length /> -1. Hence by induction hypothesis, ^(#5) is the result of substituting F(R 2 ) in F(ft 4 ) for the sentential variable Pi. But F(# 3 ) is just F(ΊR^) which is iF(R 4 ); further, F(Rj) is just F(ΊR 5 ) which is πF(β 5 ). Thus F(Ri) is the result of substituting F(R 2 ) in F(β 3 ) for Pi.
Case 2: β 3 = R 4 vR 5 , for some fl 4 and R 5 . Then iRi = β 6 v R 7 , where R 6 is the result of substituting R 2 in β 4 for P t and β 7 is the result of substituting R 2 in iR 5 for P;. Since the length of R 4 is less than p and the length of R 5 is less than /?, we have F (R 6 ) is the result of substituting i 7^) in F(β 4 ) for Pi and P(β 7 ) is the result of substituting
Case 3: R 3 =β 4 & β 5 , for some R 4 and R 5 . This case is exactly the same as Case 2, interchanging "&" and ' V\ Thus the lemma is true for n = p, and hence it is true for all n. The next theorem will be of fundamental importance in the work to follow. It simply tells us that if we have a proof in either SCF or SCT, then we can transform it into a proof in the other system by means of the function F. Proof: By induction on the number, n, of steps in the proof; n will be called the length of the proof. The theorem may be broken into two parts. First suppose R l9 R 2 , . . . , R n is a proof in SCT of R n . We want to show that F(R X ), F(R 2 ), . . . , F(R n ) is a proof of F{R n ) in SCF. Suppose n = 1. Then R λ is an axiom of SCT. But fa = F(ta), . . . , and fd = F(td). Hence F(βJ is a proof of F(RJ in SCF, and thus this half of the theorem holds for n = 1. Now, suppose this first half of the theorem holds for all n less than some number p, where p is greater than 1. We must show that this half of the theorem holds for p. Suppose R lf R 2 , . . . , R p is a proof in SCT of R p . We want to show that F(R X ), F{R 2 ), . . . , F(R p ) is a proof in SCF of F(Rp). The only question that may arise concerns step p, for by the induction hypothesis, the steps through p -1 constitute a proof. Consider the justification for step p.
Case 1: Rp is an axiom. This case is the same as for n = 1. Case 2: R p follows by substitution of the sentence R in Rj for the sentential variable P, . Then by Lemma 1, F(R P ) follows by substitution of the sentence F(R) in F(Rj) for the sentential variable P f .
Case 3: R p follows by Γ-implication from two previous sentences Rί and Rj, where Rj = iRi vR p .
But then F(Rj) is just F(iRi vR p ) which is iF(Ri) &F(Rp). Hence F(R p ) follows from F(Ri) and F(Rj) by F-implication.
Thus the first half of the theorem holds for n = p, and hence for all n. The proof of the second half of the theorem relies on the fact that F{F{R)) = R (Theorem 1) and is exactly similar to the above proof, using Lemma 2 in place of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1: H χ R if and only if ±-p F(R). Corollary 2: Let λ be a set of sentences, and let F(\) be the set of sentences whose members are the F-transforms of the members of χ. Then \v-τ Rif and only if F(λ) \-F F(R).
Proof: Note that a step R{ in the SCT proof is a member of λ if and only if F(R{) is a member of F(λ). The proof is then the same as the proof for the Theorem of Proof Correspondence.
I will now proceed to prove theorems analogous to the first three presented for SCT, above.
Theorem A f : If R is any sentence of L and \-p R, then R is LF.
Proof: The proof is exactly parallel to the proof for Theorem A. Note that all of the axioms for SCF are LF, and that the rules of proof preserve the property of being LF. The theorem then follows immediately.
Theorem B': SCF is consistent in the sense that there is no sentence R of L such that i -p R and Vp-\R.

Proof: Suppose there were a sentence R such that 177 R and v-p iβ, Then by Theorem 1, \-p F(F(R)) and v-P iF(F(R)). Then by definition of F, t-F F(iF(R)). Then by Corollary 1, ^F(fl) and \~τ iF(R). But this contradicts Theorem B.
Hence there is no sentence R of L such that \-p R and \~P iR.
Theorem C': The axioms fa-fd are independent. That is, it is not possible to prove any one of the axioms from all of the others.
Proof: Suppose the theorem were false, and that there is a proof of one of the axioms from the others. Note that ta = F(fa), . .
. , and td = F(fd).
Then by the Theorem of Proof Correspondence, one could transform the SCF proof into an SCT proof in which one of the SCT axioms is proven from the others. But this contradicts Theorem C. Hence the axioms fa-fd are independent. I will prove a few intermediate theorems before proving the remaining analogous theorems. It seems then that the system SCF has all of the "nice" logical properties that the system SCT possesses.
4. Further Comments. The obvious next step to take is to formulate a system of predicate calculus for logically false sentences. This work is currently in progress.
Another interesting problem that arises in connection with this study is developing an analogous finite axiomatization for logically contingent (LC) sentences. There are many difficulties. For example, consider possible rules of proof for such a system. Clearly the rule of substitution cannot be used as it stands. P 1 v P 2 is LC, but the result of substituting ΊP X for P 2 in that sentence would not be LC. This difficulty suggests a rule of substitution something like the following: We may substitute in a sentence of L for a sentential variable any LC sentence of L that has no sentential variables in common with the original sentence except perhaps the variable for which substitution is being made.
Other difficulties with rules of proof arise when one considers what possible deductions could be made from R λ & R 2 or RιvR 2 . If all we know about R ί is that it is LC (has occurred in the proof), then we can conclude nothing about R 2 from either the fact that R x & R 2 is LC (has occurred in the proof) or the fact that R x vR 2 is LC (has occurred in the proof). This does suggest a rule something like: From R λ & R 2 and R λ vR 2 , both R λ and R 2 may be obtained.
Some oddities also arise in the meta-characterization of such a system. We would not want SCC to be consistent in the sense that there is no sentence such that both it and its negation are provable in the system. On the contrary, if a sentence is provable, then we want its negation to be provable as well, for if R is LC, then so is ΊR. Thus if the system is complete in the sense that for any LC sentence R of L, R is provable in SCC, then the system must be inconsistent in the above sense. However, we would want SCC to be consistent in the sense that not every sentence of L is provable in the system.
There are several points that lead me to suspect that SCC is finitely axiomatizable, in spite of these and other difficulties. First, of course, is the fact that SCT and SCF are both finitely axiomatizable. Secondly, the set of LC sentences of L is completely decidable by truth tables. It would seem odd to have a completely decidable set of sentences that was not finitely axiomatizable.
